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Dear Sir,
“The Australian Tsunami Warning System and lessons
from the 2 April 2007 Solomon Islands tsunami alert in Aus-
tralia”
At 06:40 Australian Eastern Standard Time (AEST) on
Monday 2 April 2007, a magnitude 8.1 earthquake 10km
beneath the sea in the Solomon Islands generated a tsunami
(Geoscience Australia, 2007). Locally, this tsunami was
large and caused a notable loss of life, extensive destruc-
tion to homes, infrastructure and agricultural systems. For
those communities within the Solomon Islands affected, this
event was every bit a natural disaster. This event was also
signiﬁcant to Australia because for the ﬁrst time the Aus-
tralian Tsunami Warning System (ATWS) swung in to ac-
tion. The ATWS was established following the catastrophic
Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004 and is costing
approximately AUS$70million. The system is due to be
fully operational by mid 2009.
The ATWS consists of two components. First is the phys-
ical hardware – the actual detection and monitoring equip-
ment. The hardware falls under the responsibility of Geo-
scienceAustralia(GA)whichisrequiredtodetect, locateand
evaluate potential tsunami generating earthquakes and the
Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) which is responsible for mon-
itoring deep water tsunami detection buoys and tide gauges
at various points in the SW Paciﬁc and Indian Oceans. To-
gether, these agencies evaluate incoming data and where ap-
propriate calculate and/or provide arrival times of tsunami
for locations along Australia’s coast. Second is the in-
formation and warning and emergency management com-
ponent. Where necessary, the BoM is required to issue
alert and warning messages to Emergency Management Aus-
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tralia(EMA),theStateEmergencyServices(SES)andmedia
agencies.
When a tsunami has been detected (as on the 2 April),
if sufﬁcient time allows, the BoM runs simulations to de-
termine the probable wave height along Australia’s coasts.
When time is not available, the BoM selects pre-computed
simulations for an event “similar” in magnitude to that which
has been generated. This information is used by the SES’s to
determine whether evacuation orders should be issued to lo-
cal authorities and communities. On the 2 April 2007, Geo-
science Australia successfully determined the location, size
and characteristics of the earthquake and the BoM the prob-
ability and magnitude of a tsunami. At 07:20AEST, the Bu-
reau of Meteorology issued its ﬁrst National Tsunami Bul-
letin (or advisory message). At this point, the New South
Wales State Tsunami Disaster Management Plan was acti-
vated.
At 08:30AEST, the New South Wales State Emergency
Service opened its State Emergency Operations Centre and
began following its protocol for contacting key organiza-
tions such as life surf saving clubs and port authorities along
the State’s coastline either directly from State Headquar-
ters or via its Regional and Local Area Controllers. At this
point, beaches began to be evacuated, boats were ordered to
move to deeper water and some low lying coastal schools
were evacuated. Simultaneously, news of a potentially “dan-
gerous” tsunami spread across all media networks and live
streaming of the warning began.
Fortunately for Australia, only a small tsunami affected
the eastern seaboard, and no losses occurred. In the week
thatfollowedthis event, themediaandmembers ofthepublic
rightly asked probing questions about the effectiveness of the
ATWS and whether it had performed adequately or, as many
in the media reported, had failed.
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Such questions should be asked and federal and state au-
thorities are currently engaged in a process of reﬂection,
analysis and learning. However, it is worth noting the fol-
lowing:
1. the physical infrastructure of the ATWS worked very
well. Geoscience Australia were able to quickly locate
the earthquake and determine its character;
2. the Bureau of Meteorology were able to determine ap-
propriate simulations of the tsunami and issued a Na-
tional Tsunami Bulletin within 40min of the event; and
3. transmission of the alert message to Emergency Man-
agement Australia, the State Emergency Service’s and
media occurred effectively.
However, whilst evacuation orders were issued at speciﬁc
points along the NSW coastline, the public and the media
were confused about the nature, meaning and intent of the
alerts and warnings and for most, it was not clear what was
happening. This has taught us two important lessons. First,
thephysicalwarningsystemisnotenoughinitselftoresultin
a reduction of vulnerability to tsunami. Just because we have
a warning system does not mean the job is done. Second,
much work needs to be undertaken to ensure that communi-
ties have been educated about tsunami hazard and risk and
what alert and warning messages mean, how to react, where
to evacuate and how quickly to respond. Furthermore, the
emergency services and the Emergency Management Aus-
tralia must work urgently to effect community tsunami dis-
aster management planning, identiﬁcation of safe evacuation
zones, testing and evaluation of tsunami warning messages
and trialing of these plans with the public. Such obvious
recommendations have been made elsewhere (see Bird and
Dominey-Howes, 2006, 2007; Lowe et al., 2007) but the
events of 2 April 2007 demonstrate very clearly the need for
such actions.
Since December 2004, the Australian federal government
– its agencies and the Australian state emergency services
have made tremendous efforts towards the development and
deployment of an operational Australian Tsunami Warning
System and these efforts are to be congratulated. However,
much more work needs to be completed to ensure that the
emergency management elements of warning and evacua-
tion are properly developed, communicated to the public and
tested. Without the latter, Australia’s coastal people remain
vulnerable to tsunami and the $70million of investment may
not be realised.
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